Forget Fuck You, Penguin. When the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) wraps up its 15th triennial Conference of the Parties (COP 15) in Doha, Qatar, tomorrow, it will go down as one big middle finger to ocean health.Andrew over on Southern Fried Science has a running tally of COP 15 marine conservation outcomes.
A lot of analysis is sure to be written on the total ocean conservation fail at COP 15. I'm looking forward to hearing from several colleagues who were in attendance. But I thought it might be worth examining the CITES process.
How Do Species Get on a CITES Appendix?
At each COP, the 175-nations (or Parties) submit proposals to list species on the Appendices, remove species from the Appendices, or transfer species from one Appendix to another. Species proposals are discussed and either passed or defeated by consensus or voted upon. Each Party gets one vote. It takes two-thirds of the Parties present and voting to pass a species proposal.
Decisions to propose CITES listing is based on the best available scientific evidence on species biomass, distribution, genomics, ecological connectivity, and known threats and vulnerability to commercial trade. Consideration for CITES listing is, by mandate, to include species not necessarily threatened with extinction, but in which trade must be controlled in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival:
CITES RESOLVES that, when considering proposals to amend Appendix I or II, the Parties shall, by virtue of the precautionary approach and in case of uncertainty either as regards the status of a species or the impact of trade on the conservation of a species, act in the best interest of the conservation of the species concerned and adopt measures that are proportionate to the anticipated risks to the species.What About This Secret Ballot I Keep Hearing About?
Parties may request a secret ballot to vote on proposals; this often happens on proposals that are highly controversial. At COP 15, the secret ballot was invoked for proposals on CITES listings for tuna, sharks, polar bears, and deep water corals. Secret ballots prevent others from knowing how a delegate from a Party has voted; secret ballots allow a delegate to cast a vote but not be held accountable to his or her government or the people he or she represents.
Currently, it takes only eleven Parties to support a proposal to hold a secret ballot. During the COP 12 meeting, Chile, supported by Australia and the US, proposed that the vote on the secret ballot motion be decided by one-third of the Parties to encourage accountability and transparency. However, South Africa, Namibia, Guinea, China, Cuba and Antigua and Barbuda opposed the revision, stating that secret ballots allow Parties to vote freely. Denmark, on behalf of the EU, proposed that the Standing Committee should examine existing rules of procedures and practices of the use of secret ballots in comparable international processes.
Why Is A Secret Ballot Invoked?
The answer depends on who you ask. Since this is my blog, I'll offer my own perspective. Secret ballots are typically employed to eliminate risks of coercion. We're familiar with examples of hard coercion, where somebody issues a direct threat to a voter. "Nice kneecaps you have there ... be a shame if something unfortunate should happen to them."
But coercion doesn't always have to involve threats, it can also be bought. In this case, secret ballots can insulate against easy detection of vote buying. For example, Japan was accused of vote buying prior to the 2008 International Whaling Commission (IWC) meeting after it hosted seminars on the sustainable use of whales that was attended by 12 African and Asian countries - including landlocked Laos - that had recently joined the IWC or were considering doing so. While difficult to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt, there is a strong link between the votes for Japan in support of commercial whaling and the aid money some IWC members have received in either international development funds or fisheries subsidies.
What Do CITES Deliberations Look Like?
See for yourself. Below is a redacted section from the COP 15 meeting summary documents (CoP 15 Com. I Rec. 10) that focuses on discussions for the defeated proposal seeking inclusion of red and pink deep water corals (Coralliidae) under CITES II listing. You can review any of the COP 15 summary documents here.
The United States introduced proposal CoP15 Prop. 21 for the inclusion of all species of Coralliidae in Appendix II, highlighting the need for sustainable management of the populations of the species involved in trade. They referred to the development of an identification manual for precious corals and related species, which should be published in 2010.
Tunisia, supported by Morocco, opposed the proposal, reporting that they had made considerable efforts to protect the species in their country and had various laws to conserve their extensive marine resources. They considered that adequate controls were already in place and that the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) was a more appropriate management body. They thought that listing in Appendix II would have negative effects on the conservation of the species, and concluded that, if a vote was taken on the issue, it should be by secret ballot.
Japan also opposed the proposal for several reasons: a) declines in amounts landed did not reflect declines in biomass but were related to economic factors; b) coral fishing in Japan was strictly controlled; c) there were substantial populations of Coralliidae outside of the known fishing areas, contrary to the proposal; d) none of the species was included in the IUCN Red List; e) they had developed new management measures in 2008, which they were currently implementing; f) they were concerned that the livelihood of traditional coral fishermen would be affected; and g) they believed that, if the precious corals were to be listed, consumers would think that buying them would be environmentally unfriendly.
The representative of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reiterated the view of their Expert Advisory Panel that the taxon did not fulfil the criteria for listing in Appendix II, adding that they had not reviewed additional information provided by the United States during the meeting. They noted that corals could face additional risks in the future from new fishing areas, particularly in vulnerable and ecologically important areas such as seamounts. Iceland, Indonesia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Singapore and Vanuatu all spoke against the proposal, with Malaysia referring to implementation problems relating to identification of specimens and control of pre-Convention specimens. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya agreed with Tunisia that the GFCM was the most appropriate management body for precious corals, urged the Parties to allow them more time to study populations of the species and emphasized the need to consider the socio-economic repercussions on local people.
Croatia, supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Arab Emirates, spoke in favour of the proposal, describing the extreme threats to the populations in their territory. Contrary to other speakers, the Islamic Republic of Iran, supported by SeaWeb, felt that, unless the proposal was accepted, both the continued trade in precious corals and the livelihood of the people involved would be in doubt. Spain, on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, also supported the proposal, referring to the longevity and slow growth of precious corals, which should be taken into consideration; the massive decline in landings since the 1980s; and that deep water stocks were likely to experience declines unless harvesting was regulated. SeaWeb, in a statement endorsed by the Pew Environment Group, questioned the FAO conclusions, explaining that it was difficult to apply the existing criteria to corals; they considered that the collection method for precious coral should be described as mining, rather than fishing or harvesting, because there was no renewal of the resource. They concluded by noting the relevance to this issue of an International Coral Reef Initiative recommendation on trade in corals, contained in document CoP15 Inf. 42.
The United States responded to the concerns raised by previous speakers, reiterated the particular vulnerability of precious corals, and showed their commitment to working with exporting range States by providing capacity-building support, and financial assistance for a workshop on species identification and the making of non-detriment findings.
The Chair noted that more than 10 Parties supported the request of Tunisia for a secret ballot and the proposal was then put to a vote by secret ballot. The result of the vote was 64 in favour, 59 against with 10 abstentions. The proposal was thus rejected. The United States withdrew document CoP15 Doc. 54.
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